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In this paper, we prove that the unconditionally secure key can be surprisingly extracted from
multi-photon emission part in the photon polarization-based QKD. One example is shown by ex-
plicitly proving that one can indeed generate an unconditionally secure key from Alice’s two-photon
emission part in “Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks
for weak laser pulses implementations” proposed by V. Scarani et al., in Phys. Rev. Lett. 92,
057901 (2004), which is called SARG04. This protocol uses the same four states as in BB84 and
differs only in the classical post-processing protocol. It is, thus, interesting to see how the classical
post-processing of quantum key distribution might qualitatively change its security. We also show
that one can generate an unconditionally secure key from the single to the four-photon part in a
generalized SARG04 that uses six states. Finally, we also compare the bit error rate threshold of
these protocols with the one in BB84 and the original six-state protocol assuming a depolarizing
channel.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two separate
parties, the sender Alice and the receiver Bob, to share
a secret key with negligible leakage of its information to
an eavesdropper Eve. The best known QKD protocol
is BB84 protocol published by Bennett and Brassard in
1984 [1]. Many aspects of the BB84 protocol including
the unconditional security [2, 3, 4] and its implementa-
tions [5] has been investigated. BB84 is unconditionally
secure if Alice emits a single-photon. However, if Alice
emits multi-photon, Eve in principle gets full information
on bit values without inducing any bit error by exploiting
a photon number splitting attack (PNS) [6].
Recently, Scarani, et.al. [7] have proposed a QKD
(SARG04) that is robust against PNS attack. This pro-
tocol uses exactly the same four states as the one in
BB84, and only the classical data processing is different
from BB84. A key goal of this paper is to demonstrate
that among many modifications of BB84 [8], SARG04 is
the first essential modification in the sense that it has a
property that BB84-type QKD has never accomplished,
i.e., one may generate a secure key not only from the
single-photon part, but rather surprisingly also from a
two-photon part. In SARG04, the classical part is mod-
ified in such a way that after Alice’s initial broadcast,
the two remaining states are nonorthogonal. Thus, even
by using PNS attack, Eve cannot discriminate the state
deterministically. This is an intuition that one might ex-
pect to generate a secure key from the two-photon part.
We remark that this kind of secure key distillation is
natural from the viewpoint of an unambiguous state dis-
crimination [9]. It is known that an unambiguous dis-
crimination among N states of a qubit space is only pos-
sible when at least N − 1 copies of the state are avail-
able. This means in the case of four states that we have
no chance to distill a key from more than the two-photon
part, because if Eve succeeds the discrimination, then she
can resend the corresponding state, while if she does not,
then she sends vacuum state to Bob, which disguises for
channel losses. In other words, there is no reason that
forbids the generation of a secure key from both the single-
photon and two-photon parts in a four-state protocol.
By modifying only the classical part in BB84, SARG04
might accomplish this.
Note that SARG04 differs from BB84 only in the clas-
sical communication. Thus, it is very interesting to see
how only the classical communication of QKD changes
its security, which is a fundamentally interesting ques-
tion. This is related to the viewpoint of “ Entanglement
as precondition for secure QKD” in [10]. So far, many
studies have been done to generate a single-photon source
in experiments for QKD [5]. Hence, the demonstration
of a secure key from the two-photon part has an impact
to that direction of studies. Moreover, from practical
viewpoint, an experiment for SARG04 should not be so
difficult once an experiment for BB84 is available (e.g.
see [11]). It follows that to investigate which protocol
one should perform is important from the practical view-
point. In summary, to prove the unconditional security
of SARG04 is an interesting question both from funda-
mental and practical viewpoints.
In this paper, we prove that the unconditionally secure
key can be surprisingly extracted not only from single-
photon part, but also from multi-photon part in the pho-
ton polarization-based QKD, especially two-photon part
in the SARG04 protocol. Thus, our result clearly shows
that the modification of only the classical communica-
tion part in QKD can change its quality. In this paper,
we assume that Alice has a coherent light source and
Bob has a single-photon detector with no dark count.
To prove the security of the two-photon part, we gen-
eralize the idea of “squash operation” in [4], where the
authors treat the multi-photon part just by assuming the
worst case scenario for BB84. In our case, we cannot rely
on this scenario, because this scenario completely denies
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FIG. 1: Bob’s measurement basis in the Bloch sphere. Note
that the random rotation RK
′
just changes the definition of
the outcomes and does not change the bases as a set.
a chance to generate a secure key form the two-photon
part. The generalization we made can widely apply to the
multi-photon parts in most of polarization based QKD,
such as a modified SARG04 protocol (based on six states)
that we propose in this paper. In this protocol a secure
key can be generated from the single to the four-photon
part.
This paper consists of the following. We first present
our notations and describe how SARG04 works. After
that, we prove the security of the protocol with the single-
photon part and two-photon part. Finally, we compare
the security of SARG04 with the one of BB84, and we
end this paper with mentioning a natural generalization
of SARG04 followed by a summary.
We first define several notations. {|0x〉, |1x〉} is a X-
basis for a qubit, which is related to Z-basis and Y -
basis by {|jz〉 ≡ [|0x〉 + (−1)j|1x〉]/
√
2} (j = 0, 1) and
{|jy〉 ≡ [|0x〉+i(−1)j|1x〉]/
√
2}, respectively. We define a
filtering operator F = sin pi8 |0x〉〈0x|+cos pi8 |1x〉〈1x|, a pi/2
rotation around Y -axis R ≡ cos pi4 1 qubit+sin pi4 (|1x〉〈0x|−
|0x〉〈1x|), and |ϕj〉 ≡ cos pi8 |0x〉 + (−1)j sin pi8 |1x〉, where
1 qubit ≡
∑1
j=0 |jx〉〈jx|. Note that R|ϕ1〉 = |ϕ0〉. We in-
troduce Pˆ (X |Ψ〉) ≡ X |Ψ〉〈Ψ|X†, |χ0±〉 = 1√2 (|0z〉|0z〉 ±
|1z〉|1z〉), |χ1±〉 = 1√2 (|0z〉|1z〉 ± |1z〉|0z〉), |ν, ϕ〉 ≡ |ϕ〉⊗ν ,
and |ϕj〉 satisfing 〈ϕj |ϕj〉 = 0.
We now explain how SARG04 works. Since this proto-
col is similar to B92 protocol [12], we explain SARG04 in
the context of the modification of B92 protocol. Imagine
the B92 where Alice randomly sends |ν, ϕj〉 (j = 0, 1) de-
pending on the bit value j, while Bob performs the B92
measurement where he randomly chooses a measurement
basis from {|ϕj′〉, |ϕj′ 〉} (j′ = 0, 1) (see also Fig. 1). If his
measurement outcome is ϕ1 or ϕ0, which we call conclu-
sive, then Bob broadcasts that he got a conclusive results.
From the outcome, he can infer which bit value Alice sent
to him, i.e., when the outcome is ϕ1 (ϕ0), he concludes
that Alice sent bit value 0 (1).
We can convert the above B92 into SARG04 just im-
posing Alice to perform a rotation RK just before send-
ing the state, and imposing Bob to perform a rota-
tion R−K
′
just before performing the B92 measurement.
Here, each of K and K ′ is randomly chosen from 0 to 3
(R0 ≡ 1 qubit). After Bob performs the measurement, Al-
ice broadcasts to Bob which B92 she has chosen, i.e., she
broadcasts K. If K = K ′, then Bob broadcasts whether
the measurement outcome is conclusive or not, and if
K 6= K ′, then they discard all corresponding data. It
is easy to see that Alice and Bob perform the same op-
erations as in BB84 (see also Fig. 1). Intuitively, the
symmetrization of a quantum channel, including Eve’s
action, given by the random rotation R provides an ad-
vantage to SARG04 over the B92. Actually, we will prove
an error threshold of SARG04 that is independent of
quantum channel losses, which is a big difference from
the case for the B92 [13].
Before proving the unconditional security of SARG04
with ν-photon, we describe how we treat the case that
Bob’s measurement outcome is both ϕj′ and ϕj′ . This
happens because of multi-photon detections or dark
counts. In such a case, we impose Bob to decide his mea-
surement outcome randomly. Note that Bob can equiva-
lently do this by locally preparing a random qubit state
followed by the measurement on it. We pessimistically
assume that Eve prepares the qubit state instead of Bob.
Since we can assume that Eve sends a qubit state in the
non-ambiguity case, without threatening any security we
consider Eve who always sends a qubit state or vacuum
state to Bob. This process can be regarded as a “squash
operation” [4].
In order to prove the security of SARG04, we construct
an unconditionally secure Entanglement Distillation Pro-
tocol with ν-photon (EDP-ν) that can be converted
to SARG04 with ν-photon. This protocol employs an
EDP [14] based on Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes
[3, 15]. In EDP-ν, Alice creates many pairs of qubits in
the state |Ψ(ν)〉AB = 1√2 (|0z〉A|ν, ϕ0〉B + |1z〉A|ν, ϕ1〉B),
and after randomly applying the rotation RK to the sys-
tem B, Alice sends the system B to Bob. On the other
hand, Bob randomly applies the rotation R−K
′
to the
qubit state, and then he performs a filtering operation
whose successful and failure operation is described by
Kraus operators F and
√
1 qubit − F 2, respectively. Af-
ter many repetition of state sending and Bob’s operation,
they use classical communication so that they keep the
qubit pairs where Bob’s filtering succeeds with K = K ′.
From these pairs, they randomly choose test pairs that
are subjected to measurements in the Z-basis by Alice
and Bob. Thanks to random sampling theorem, the test
pairs give us a good estimation of the bit error rate on
the remaining pairs (code pairs) provided that the num-
ber of the test and code pairs are large enough. If they
can estimate the upper bound of the phase error rate on
the code pairs, they can choose CSS codes that correct
both bit and phase errors on the code pairs so that they
share some maximally entangled states in the form of
|χ0+〉. Finally, by performing Z-basis measurement on
those states, they share a secret key.
To confirm that EDP-ν is completely equivalent to
SARG04, first note that Alice can perform Z-basis mea-
surement just before sending the system B without
changing any measurement outcome. It follows that Al-
ice randomly sends |ν, ϕj〉 (j = 0, 1), and this is ex-
actly what Alice does in SARG04. Similarly, we can
3EVE
A
B
-K’
R FR
K
Ψ 0x
(ν=2)
R
K
FIG. 2: In the two-photon case (i.e., ν = 2), Alice first pre-
pares three-qubit in the state of |Ψ(ν=2)〉AB. After some op-
erations by Alice and Bob, they try to distill a key from a
final state of the system A and B (black dots) if K = K′.
allow Bob to perform Z-basis measurement just after
the filtering operation, which is completely the same
as the measurement randomly chosen from {|ϕj′ 〉, |ϕj′ 〉}
basis (j′ = 0, 1). This can be seen by noting that
F |j′z〉〈j′z |F † = 12 |ϕj′ 〉〈ϕj′ |. By combining the random
rotation, it is obvious that Bob’s operation in EDP-ν is
completely the same as the one Bob does in SARG04.
Note that successful filtering events corresponds to the
conclusive events.
Since we have seen the equivalence of EDP-ν to
SARG04, we prove the security of SARG04 based on
EDP-ν. Note that the bit error rate on the code pairs
is well estimated by the test pairs, hence all we have to
consider is how to estimate the phase error rate on the
code qubit pairs from the bit error rate. Intuitively, this
phase error estimation is given by the symmetry of the
rotations R, and the property of the filtering operation
F [13, 16]. Let us define p
(l)
L,ν (L = {Bit,Phase,Fil})
as an expectation value for a particular lth qubit pair of
the ν-photon part having an event in L, conditioned on
arbitrary configurations of an event in L or the failure fil-
tering including Bob’s vacuum detection for the previous
l− 1 pairs. Furthermore, let us define a random variable
XsL,ν ≡ nsL,ν −
∑s
l=1 p
(l)
L,ν , where n
s
L,ν is the number of
events L with ν-photon actually has happened from 1st
pair to sth pair. By directly applying Azuma’s inequality
[17] to XsL,ν , one can show that
∑s
l=1 p
(l)
L,ν → nsL,ν with
exponentially as the number of pairs s increases. Thus,
we have the following theorem.
THEOREM: If Cp
(l)
bit,ν + C
′p(l)fil,ν > p
(l)
ph,ν holds, then
Ce
(ν)
bit +C
′ > e(ν)ph is exponentially reliable as the number
of successfully filtering states increases. Here e
(ν)
bit/ph is
the actual bit/phase error rate normalized by the actual
successful filtering events.
We emphasize that thanks to Azuma’s inequality this
theorem holds even when Eve performs the most general
attack, including coherent attacks. Our theorem is a gen-
eralization of the discussion in [16]. Now, we are only left
to obtain the inequality for a particular qubit pair in the
form of Cpbit,ν + C
′pfil,ν > pph,ν.
We remark that the pessimistic assumption on the
state Eve sends to Bob and the above theorem are impor-
tant observations. With these observations, we are left
only to calculate the state of a qubit pair state, and find
the relationship that holds for any Eve’s action, which are
straight forward. Moreover, to simplify Eve’s action, we
define “trash” systems that are qubits originated from
multi-photon, but Bob has no interest in. Since Bob
never care about the state of “trash” after Eve’s action,
we can safely assume that the final state of each trash is
in a particular state, say |0x〉trash (see also Fig. 2). Since
we have put no assumption on Alice and Bob other than
they use qubits, our basic strategy for the security proof
can widely apply to any photon number part in most of
polarization based QKD.
For the later convenience, let ρ
(ν)
qubit be the pair
qubit state stemming from the ν-photon part. With
this state, pL,ν is expressed as pfil,ν = Tr
[
ρ
(ν)
qubit
]
,
pbit,ν = Tr
[
ρ
(ν)
qubit
∑
m=+,− Pˆ (|χ1,m〉)
]
, and pph,ν =
Tr
[
ρ
(ν)
qubit
∑
m′=0,1 Pˆ (|χm′,−〉)
]
. To obtain ρ
(ν)
qubit, we first
consider the final state of |Ψ(ν)〉AB after Alice, Bob, and
Eve’s operations with K = K ′. This state is obtained by
tracing out the every other pair from the total state, to
which Eve has performed an arbitrary operation, includ-
ing the one in coherent attacks. The final (unnormalized)
state can be expressed as ρ
(ν)
fin =
∑
f ρ
(f,ν)
fin , where f is an
index for an arbitrary matrix representing Eve’s action
E
(f,ν)
B on ν-photon [18].
In the single-photon case (i.e., ν = 1), ρ
(ν)
fin =
ρ
(ν=1)
qubit and ρ
(f,ν=1)
fin = ρ
(f,ν=1)
qubit . It is a bit te-
dious but straight forward to see that pph,1 =
3
2pbit,1
for ρ
(f,ν=1)
qubit stemming from any E
(f,ν=1)
B . Thus,
by the linearity of the density matrix, we conclude
that e
(1)
ph =
3
2e
(1)
bit . Furthermore, one can also
show that 〈χ0−|ρ(ν=1)qubit |χ0−〉 ≥ 2〈χ1+|ρ(ν=1)qubit |χ1+〉 and
2〈χ1−|ρ(ν=1)qubit |χ1−〉 ≥ 〈χ0−|ρ(ν=1)qubit |χ0−〉 always hold,
which implies that there is a mutual information between
phase and bit error patterns.
In the two-photon case (ν = 2), ρ
(ν=2)
qubit and ρ
(f,ν=2)
qubit
are obtained by taking projection to ρ
(ν=2)
fin and ρ
(f,ν=2)
fin
by |0x〉trash that can be expressed via a 2 × 2 matrix,
E
(f,u)
B (u = 0, 1) [19]. It is tedious but straight forward
to see that if y > g(x) ≡ 16
(
3− 2x+
√
6− 6√2x+ 4x2
)
is satisfied, then xpbit,ν=2 + ypfil,ν=2 > pph,ν=2 holds for
any E
(f,u)
B [20]. Thus, we pessimistically conclude that
xe
(2)
bit + g(x) = e
(2)
ph . Note that e
(2)
ph 6= 0 even when e(2)bit =
0 because Inf[g(x)] = sin2 pi8 , which means Eve can get
some information on the key without introducing any bit
error in ν = 2 case. In ν = 2 case, we cannot find any
mutual information between the bit and phase errors.
Since we have finished the phase error estimation, we
can calculate the key generation rate for SARG04. By
assuming the random hashing CSS code [14, 21], the
key generation rate for ν-photon part Rν is asymptot-
ically represented by Rν = 1 − H(Xν , Zν) [21], where
H(Xν , Zν) is the entropy of bit and phase error pattern
in the ν-photon part. By solving Rν > 0, we can show
4that up to e
(1)
bit ∼ 9.68% (this is the same as the one re-
cently obtained in [22] without the “preprocessing”) and
e
(2)
bit ∼ 2.71% (when x ∼ 2.747) we can distill a secure key
from the ν-photon part. To compare the bit error rate
threshold of SARG04 to the one of BB84, we assume that
Eve simulates a depolarizing channel where a ν-photon
state ρ⊗ν evolves to
(
1− 4p3
)
ρ⊗ν+ 4p3 (1 qubit/2)
⊗ν . Here,
p is a depolarizing rate. Since e
(ν)
bit = 4p/(3 + 4p) in
this channel, the single-photon and two-photon part of
SARG04 is secure up to p ∼ 8.04% and p ∼ 2.08%, re-
spectively while BB84 with one-way classical communi-
cation is secure up to p ∼ 16.5% [3].
We can express a total key rate R by using the de-
coy state [23], which allows us to use an imperfect light
source and imperfect threshold detectors. This idea gives
the lower bound of the fraction of Bob’s conclusive re-
sults conditioned on ν-photon emission as ξ(ν) and the
upper bound of the bit error as e
(ν)
bit . From them, we
can compute the upper bound of the conditional en-
tropy of the phase error pattern given the bit error
patter, which is denoted by H(Zν |Xν). Hence, R =
−Pconch(ebit) +
∑2
ν=1 ξ(ν)
(
1 − H(Zν |Xν)
)
[4, 21, 23].
Here, Pconc is a fraction that Bob obtains the conclusive
results and ebit is the bit error rate on every conclusive
result.
Note that our security analysis can directly apply
to a modified six-state protocol, where Alice and Bob
additionally perform a random pi/2 rotation around
{|ϕj′〉, |ϕj′ 〉} axis in SARG04. By following the discus-
sion on the unambiguous state discrimination, we ex-
pect that we may distill a secure key from the single
to the four-photon part. Actually, one can show that
we can indeed generate a secure key from ν-photon part
up to the error rates of 11.2% (ν = 1), 5.60% (ν = 2),
2.37% (ν = 3), and 0.788% (ν = 4), which correspond
to p ∼ 9.49%, p ∼ 4.45%, p ∼ 1.82%, and p ∼ 0.595%,
respectively, while p ∼ 19.0% in the original six-state
protocol with one-way classical communication [21, 24].
In this paper, we prove that the unconditionally secure
key can be extracted from multi-photon emission part in
the photon polarization-based QKD. Our result demon-
strates clearly that by changing only the classical post
processing protocol, the foundations of the security can
change qualitatively.
We thank J.-C. Boileau, J. Batuwantudawe, M. Koashi
and F. Fung for helpful discussions.
[1] C.H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Proceedings of IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Computers, Systems and Sig-
nal Processing, 175 (1984).
[2] D. Mayers, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1109,
Springer–Verlag, 343 (1996). H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau,
Science 283, 2050 (1999). H. Inamori, N. Lu¨tkenhaus,
and D. Mayers, quant-ph/0107017.
[3] P. W. Shor, and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441
(2000).
[4] D. Gottesman, H.-K. Lo, N. Lu¨etkenhaus, and J. Preskill,
Quantum Information and Computation, Vol. 4, No. 5,
325 (2004).
[5] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys, 74, 145 (2002).
[6] G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, B.C. Sanders, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 85, 1330 (2000).
[7] V. Scarani, A. Acin, G. Ribordy, and N. Gisin, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004).
[8] H-K. Lo, H. F. Chau, and M. Ardehali, J. of Cryp-
tology, ISSN: 0933-2790 (Paper) 1432-1378 (Online),
March (2004), (10.1007/s00145-004-0142-y), (Springer-
Verlag New York, LLC). ArXiv:quant-ph/0011056.
[9] A. Chefles, arXiv:quant-ph/0105016.
[10] M. Curty, M. Lewenstein, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 92, 217903 (2004)
[11] C. Elliott, A. Colvin, D. Pearson, O. Pikalo, J. Schlafer,
H. Yeh, arXiv:quant-ph/0503058.
[12] C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett, 68, 3121 (1992).
[13] K. Tamaki and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 69, 032316
(2004).
[14] C. H. Bennett, D. P. DiVincenzo, J. A. Smolin, and W.K.
Wootters, Phys. Rev. A 54, 3824 (1996).
[15] A. R. Calderbank and P. W. Shor, Phys. Rev. A 54, 1098
(1996), A. M. Steane, Proc. R. Soc. London A 452, 2551
(1996).
[16] J. C. Boileau, K. Tamaki, J. Batuwantudawe, R.
Laflamme, and, J. Renes, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94 040503
(2005).
[17] K. Azuma, Tohuku Math. J. 19 357 (1967).
[18] ρ
(f,ν)
fin ≡ Pˆ (
∑3
K=0 |ψ
(ν)
K 〉), |ψ
(ν)
K 〉 = 1 A ⊗(
F−K(ν) E
(f,ν)
B
(
RK
)⊗ν )
|Ψ(ν)〉AB, where F
−K
(ν=1) ≡ FR
−K ,
and F−K(ν=2) ≡ FR
−K ⊗ 1 trash.
[19] ρ
(f,ν=2)
qubit =
∑3
K=0 Pˆ (|ΨK〉), where |ΨK〉 ≡
1 A ⊗
(∑1
u=0 FR
−K
B E
(f,u)
B R
K
B
)
|ξ(K,u)〉, |ξ(K,u)〉 ≡
1√
2
[
〈ux|R
K |ϕ0〉|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B + 〈ux|R
K |ϕ1〉|1z〉A|ϕ1〉B
]
,
and E
(f,u)
B ≡ trash〈0x|E
(f,ν=2)
B |ux〉trash.
[20] Note the positivity of CAbit + C
′Afil − Aph, where
~c∗AL~c
T = pL,ν=2, AL is a 8 × 8 matirx, and eight el-
ements in ~c are directly taken from E
(f,u)
B .
[21] H-K. Lo, Quantum Information and Computation, Vol.
1, No. 2, 81 (2001).
[22] C. Branciard, N. Gisin, B. Kraus, V. Scarani,
arXiv:quant-ph/0505035.
[23] H-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, Phys. Rev. Lett 94,
230504 (2005).
[24] D. Bruss, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018 (1998).
